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1. Introduction 
The European Union1 has undergone a constitutional transformation in the 
past half century. It has evolved from its origins as the European Economic 
Community, promoting economic integration, into a supranational polity 
that has come to be perceived in constitutional and even federal terms. This 
paper will explore the extent to which the modern-day EU can be said to 
possess some sort of constitution. In doing this, it will be necessary to 
decouple such a constitution from the notion of state constitutionalism and 
instead define it as a unique transnational constitution. Despite this, useful 
comparisons can be drawn between state constitutions and that of the EU, in 
order to ascertain the form the latter may take. Particularly useful in this 
regard is the analogy between the British constitutional model and the EU 
constitution. This paper concludes that the EU possesses a composite2 
constitution more akin to that of the United Kingdom rather than a formal 
written text, as is typical in continental Europe. As such, in the present 
writer’s view, the Lisbon Treaty would feature, along with the other treaties, 
as a constitutional document within the constitutional arrangements of the 
EU, without it becoming a formal constitution itself. 
 
1. The Nature of a Constitution 
Firstly, it is important to define what is meant by a constitution within the 
specific context of the EU. The dictionary defines a constitution as being ‘a 
body of fundamental principles or established precedents according to 
which a state or organization is governed.’3 However, a constitution is more 
than this rather formalistic definition suggests. As well as being a legal 
concept, constitutionalism also has a certain political impact.4 Paine suggests 
                                                           
∗ Postgraduate Research Student, School of Law, University of Aberdeen. This paper was 
presented at an AHRC Doctoral Colloquium “The European Union: Back to the Future? 
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1 Henceforth known as the EU. 
2 Composed of both written and unwritten sources. 
3 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edition OUP, Oxford 2002). 
4 R Bellamy and D Castiglione, ‘Introduction: Constitutions and Politics’ in R Bellamy and D 
Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives, 
(Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996).   
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that a constitution is a written document, which both displays certain formal 
characteristics and is publicly recognisable.5 This positivist conception of a 
constitution seems overly formalistic and ignores the fundamental place a 
constitution holds in society as distinct from other laws. The constitutional 
principles that a state represents must be distinguished from the 
constitutional text or individual constitutional documents which embody 
them.6 
The constitutional text accords with the dictionary definition of a 
constitution and that advanced by Paine. It is the constitutional text that 
must be formally valid and regulate the exercise of public power in a 
positivistic manner. This finds support in the instrumental view of a 
constitution as a superstructure for the maintenance of an independent 
normative order.7 
This, however, is merely the legal manifestation of a more fundamental 
legal/political concept. Normative conceptions consider the constitution as a 
fundamental norm upon which the whole organisation of socio-political life 
must ultimately depend.8 Therefore, two distinct elements can be identified 
that must be present in order to classify a given set of laws as a constitution. 
Firstly, the rules must regulate the exercise of political power in a given 
political entity and secondly they must be seen as embodying the 
fundamental basis of society within the polity. The validity of the former is 
assessed on the basis of Kelsen’s positivist explanation of the basic norm in 
terms of formal legitimacy.9 The validity of the latter, on the other hand, is 
assessed with reference to social or substantive legitimacy.10         
 
2. The Existence of Supranational Constitutionalism 
Our current understanding of the nature of a constitution is very much 
influenced by nineteenth-century constitutionalism and the liberalist view of 
                                                           
5 T Paine, Political Writings, (CUP, Cambridge 1989) at p. 81. 
6 C Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, (Duncker u. Humblot GmbH, Berlin 2002) ch. 1, para. 2. 
7 FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume 1: Rules and Order, (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1973).  
8D Castiglione, ‘The Political Theory of the Constitution’ in R Bellamy and D Castiglione (n 
4). 
9 M Hartney (tr), H Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) at 
pp.116-117. 
10 Essentially this is where the members of society accept the laws of that society as binding 
and comply with them. Weiler suggests that substantive legitimacy, at least at the level of 
the state, is where ‘a minority will/should accept the legitimacy of a majority decision 
because both majority and minority are part of the same Volk...,’ JHH Weiler, ‘Does Europe 
Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) European 
Law Journal 219 at p.228; see also Hurrelmann who argues that ‘a number of social 
preconditions [such as social integration] can thus be defined that have to be met in order to 
secure the normative legitimacy [or substantive legitimacy] and empirical acceptance of 
democratic institutions. A Hurrelmann, ‘European Democracy, the ‘Permissive Consensus’ 
and the collapse of the EU Constitution’ (2007) European Law Journal 343 at p. 348. 
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the nation state.11 The essence of this liberal constitutionalism is of 
government grounded in, limited by, and devoted to the protection of 
individual rights.12 The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 announced the dawn of 
the European (nation) state and a new system of spatial organisation that 
was founded in the naturalness of state sovereignty.13 It is on this basis that 
our ideas about what constitutes a constitution have evolved. It is, however, 
important to note that any discussion of constitutionalism beyond the state 
should not merely be an attempt to define transnational constitutionalism 
with reference to state constitutionalism. Instead, the constitutional 
discourse about post-state spaces needs to be attuned to the idiosyncrasies of 
such orders.14  
As a result of globalization and the increasing inter-dependence of global 
economies, states, more and more, need to devise ways to regulate their 
mutual interactions on the international level. This allows for the possible 
existence of a positivist type constitution as described above, namely a 
formally valid set of rules that governs the exercise of power within the 
organisation. Whilst this may be all that exists on the broader international 
plane, it does not preclude a more intense type of constitutionalism on a 
post-state, sub-global level. The existence of a demos15 is seen as a 
prerequisite of the existence of a state constitution.16 Therefore, the lack of a 
demos at the international level is seen as precluding the existence of a 
transnational constitution.17 This, however, is not necessarily the case 
because transnational constitutionalism may be more about normative 
neutrality and accommodation of differences than about projection of a 
common value system.18 
 
 
3. The Constitution of the European Union 
It is important to distinguish the European Union both from a state and a 
classical intergovernmental organisation. In terms of its constitution, the 
European Union is distinct from both of these entities.19 The EU is an entity 
within the international legal order, created by states which inhabit that 
legal order. However, these states share common principles such as peace, 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is these principles that 
                                                           
11 D Castiglione (n 8). 
12 Hesse and Johnson (eds), Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe, (OUP, Oxford 1995) at  
p.34. 
13 Curtin, Post national democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy, 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1997) at p.2. 
14 N Tsagourias, ‘Constitutionalism: a Theoretical Roadmap’ in N Tsagourias (ed), 
Transnational Constitutionalism, (CUP, Cambridge 2007) at p.5. 
15 A demos is a people united by a common culture and heritage. 
16 Brunner [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (German Maastricht Decision). 
17 Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 282.  
18 N Tsagourias (n 14) at p.6. 
19 N Tsagourias, ‘The Constitutional Role of General Principles of Law in International and 
European Jurisprudence’, in N Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism, at p. 87. 
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define the EU as a distinct legal order within the international legal order; 
attribute legitimacy; ensure legal coherence; foster unity; and provide 
orientation.20 Unlike international law, the European legal order affects 
individuals directly, rather than through their states.21 There is also a mutual 
interaction between the national and European legal orders which leads to a 
Europeanization of national law and a domestication of European law.22 All 
of the above has allowed the European Union to grow an indigenous 
constitution and claim constitutional autonomy.23 In this context, 
‘constitution’ does not mean a formally valid written document, but rather a 
set of fundamental principles that govern the exercise of power within the 
EU and regulate the interaction between EU institutions and member states.  
 
4. The British Constitution 
Having already demonstrated that the EU possesses a constitution, it is now 
appropriate to define the nature of this constitution. Whilst it is true that the 
legitimacy of such a constitution must be conceived of in non-statal terms, it 
is useful to draw analogies with existing state constitutions to inform our 
conceptions of the structure of the EU’s constitution. Particularly helpful in 
this regard is the analogy between the partially written but uncodified 
British constitution and that of the EU. In order to create an analytical 
framework for EU constitutionalism that is based on British 
constitutionalism it is necessary to study the latter in some depth. This will 
then form the basis of the discussion that follows on how the British 
constitutional model can be applied to the EU. 
Unlike the civil law jurisdictions of Europe, the United Kingdom does 
not have a formal, written text as its constitution. Instead the United 
Kingdom has a common-law constitution with parliamentary supremacy as 
its ‘keystone’.24 In orthodox theory of parliamentary supremacy,25 
parliament is seen as having legal sovereignty to pass any law,26 with 
                                                           
20 ibid p. 82. 
21 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1; E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the making of 
a Transnational Constitution’, (1981) 75 America Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
22 F Snyder, The Europeanization of Law, (European Law Series, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 
pp. 1-11; M Poiares Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional 
Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 332 at pp. 338-9.  
23 N Tsagourias (n 19) at p. 83. 
24 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Portland 1807); A V Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Laws of the Constitution, (10th ed, Macmillan, London 1965) at p. 
70. 
25 G Winterton, ‘The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined’ (1976) 92 
Law Q. Rev. 591 at p. 597: ‘nowhere is the development of this doctrine [of parliamentary 
supremacy] demonstrated more clearly than in the writings of Blackstone and Dicey’. 
26 W Blackstone (n 24) at p. 156: ‘[Parliament’s authority is] so transcendent and absolute, 
that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds…. It can, in short, 
do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call 
its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament’. 
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political sovereignty resting with the electorate.27 It is on this basis that 
parliament can be said to derive its moral legitimacy from democratic 
principles.28 Dicey, the pre-eminent authority on British constitutional law, 
considered that these democratic principles could act as internal checks on 
the exercise of legislative power because parliament is unlikely to legislate 
contrary to fundamental ideals that are central to its belief system.29 Such 
fundamental ideals in the British context would seem to be respect for 
representative government, democratic accountability and the rule of law.30 
However, despite these internal checks, nobody is legally competent, in the 
view of exponents of orthodox constitutional theory,31 to curtail the 
authority of parliament, not even the judiciary. 
Prima facie, this notion of absolute parliamentary supremacy does not 
seem to accord with the modern view of constitutionalism, as outlined 
above, which seeks to limit the exercise of legislative power. Furthermore, 
the lack of possibility of judicial review of primary legislation passed by the 
British parliament32 does not seem to fully accord with the rule of law, 
which is said to be a fundamental principle of British constitutional law.33 
Orthodox constitutional theory is, however, only one interpretation of 
British constitutional law. The early colonists in America, for example, took 
a different view. They based the restraints on the exercise of parliamentary 
authority that emerged after the American Revolution on a different 
interpretation of the British common law.34 This forms the basis of the strong 
power of judicial review that is vested in the American Supreme Court.35 
Many modern British constitutionalists36 believe that the common law 
power of the courts to strike down executive acts that are ultra vires37 could 
                                                           
27 AV Dicey (n 24) at p. 73: ‘The sovereign power under the English constitution is clearly 
‘Parliament.’ But the word ‘sovereignty’ is sometimes employed in a political rather than 
strictly legal sense. That body is ‘politically’ sovereign or supreme in a state the will of 
which is ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the state. In this sense of the word the electors 
of Great Britain may be said to be, together with the Crown and the Lords, or perhaps, in 
strict accuracy, independently of the King and the Peers, the body in which sovereign 
power is vested’. 
28 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in 
Britain and America’ (2001) 76 New York University Law Review 1 at p. 13-14. 
29 AV Dicey (n 24) at p. 80. 
30 DW Vick, ‘The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution’ (2002) 37 Texas 
International Law Journal 329 at p. 330. 
31 W Blackstone (n 24) at p. 91: ‘[I]f the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done 
which is unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the constitution that is 
vested with authority to control it’. 
32 AW Bradley, ‘The United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights, and 
Constitutional Review’ (1995) 17 Carodozo Law Review 233 at pp. 233-34. 
33 DW Vick (n 30). 
34 B Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (OUP, Oxford 1967) at pp.30-31. 
These restraints on parliament were found in the common law principles that protected 
Englishmen from arbitrary or unchecked government authority. 
35 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
36 TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993) at pp. 269-70; C Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The 
Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review’ 1996 Cambridge 
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be used as the basis for arguing the existence of a common law power of 
judicial review of primary legislative acts. As one writer puts it: 38 
 
The ultra vires doctrine...is an independent common-law judicial power. This 
common-law position enhances the judiciary as an independent branch of 
government inherently capable of substantively scrutinizing executive acts, as well 
as the authorizing statute  
 
Furthermore, this power of judicial review is not inconsistent with the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty because parliament is theoretically 
capable of expressly revoking the court’s power as it is with any common-
law principle.39 Similarly this extension of the court’s inherent power of 
judicial review is in conformity with the natural law and rule of law 
limitations on parliament found in orthodox constitutional theory, as 
articulated by Blackstone and Dicey.40 In a constitutional democracy, judicial 
review of both primary and secondary legislation, whilst not being a pre-
requisite,41 is the most suitable means of ensuring legislative and executive 
compliance with constitutional limits.42 Therefore, this alternative view of 
British Constitutionalism, whilst firmly anchored in British common law,43 is 
more in line with the constitutional arrangements of other EU member states 
in continental Europe. 
In continental Europe, as in the United States of America, reference is 
made in the first instance to the text of a written constitution in order to 
determine the constitutional principles of a given country. Conversely, in 
Britain, constitutional principles were traditionally derived directly from the 
unwritten common-law.44 However, written and unwritten elements are not 
mutually exclusive and both may be present in a constitutional system.45 
This is particularly evident in Britain where the lack of a formal constitution 
has not precluded reference to certain written documents which have a 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Law Journal 122 at pp. 122-23; S De Smith et al., Principles of Judicial Review, (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 1999) at p. 112-13; J Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ 1995 Public Law 72 at p. 
79. 
37 S De Smith et al. ibid. 
38 D Jenkins, ‘From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law 
Constitution’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 863 at p. 879. 
39 A Halpin, ‘The Theoretical Controversy Concerning Judicial Review’ (2001) 64 MLR 500 at 
p. 501. 
40 P Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ 1999 Public Law 428 at p. 445. 
41 D Grimm, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy’ in D W Jackson and C N Tate 
(eds) Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy Volume 77, (Greenwood Press, Westport 
1992) at p. 103.  
42 A Stone, ‘Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe’ in D W 
Jackson and CN Tate ibid. at p. 41. 
43D Jenkins, (n 38) at p. 880: ‘This version of common-law review, compatible as it is with 
Coke, Blackstone, and Dicey, represents the resurgence of a theory of judicial review that 
has long roots in British legal history’. 
44 DA Strauss, ‘Common Law Constitutional Interpretation’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago 
Law Review 877 at p. 885. 
45 RH Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2001) 
at p. 111. 
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special constitutional status. Examples of such documents are the Parliament 
Act 1911,46 the European Communities Act 1972,47 the Scotland Act 199848 
and the Human Rights Act 1998.49 Presumably, any law instituting fixed-
term parliaments, as the current UK coalition Government are proposing, 
would have a similar constitutional status. The importance of these statutes 
is not their legally binding force, because parliament can repeal them at any 
time, but rather their impact on UK Constitutionalism, due to their political 
entrenchment.50 
 
 
5. A British Model of EU Constitutionalism 
The above account of UK constitutional law may seem somewhat tangential 
and out of place in this discussion of EU constitutionalism. However, this 
essay is an attempt to extend, by analogy, the principles of the British 
common-law constitution to that of the European Union. Therefore, it is 
essential to understand the core elements of the British constitution as a 
framework for this comparison. 
It is quite striking, when examined in this manner, how many 
similarities there are between the constitutional arrangements of these two 
polities. Firstly, it is interesting to note that neither Britain nor the EU have a 
single text from which constitutional principles may be derived. However, 
both systems have several texts which have a special status and embody 
fundamental principles upon which each entity is founded.51 In addition to 
this, many of the constitutional principles which characterise the EU have 
been judge-made rather than being expressly referred to in the founding 
treaties.  
In this analogy, there appears to be several direct comparisons that 
can be made between concepts of British constitutional law and practices 
within the European Union. The first striking example of this is the 
similarity between the notion of parliamentary supremacy, on the one hand, 
and the member states as ‘masters of the treaties’52 on the other. As regards 
the former, legal supremacy is vested in the British Parliament in 
                                                           
46 This statute set limits on the powers of the House of Lords in regard to legislation. 
47 This statute incorporated the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of 
Rome) and in so doing placed limitations on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 
48 This along with the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 set 
out the principles for devolution. 
49 This acts almost like a bill of rights as it incorporates the ECHR directly into British 
domestic law. 
50 The nature of constitutional statutes was commented on by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn 
v Sunderland City Council [2003] 3 WLR 247 and is discussed in R Hazell, ‘Reinventing the 
Constitution: Can the State Survive?’ 1999 Public Law 84 at pp. 84-87. 
51 As regards the EU, such texts would include The Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union and The Treaty on European Union. 
52 Brunner (n 16). 
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Westminster,53 and in the latter case, legal supremacy is vested in the 
member states acting collectively at an inter-governmental conference and 
through subsequent ratification.54 Both bodies (Parliament and the IGC) 
have absolute legal sovereignty and are capable of passing any law they see 
fit.  
In addition to this, there is a certain similarity between the evolution 
of constitutional principles in the British common-law and the teleological 
interpretation of the treaties by the European Court of Justice.55 As Weiler 
demonstrates,56 many of the main fundamental principles that define the 
European Union as a constitutional legal order were established by the ECJ. 
These include the doctrines of direct effect,57 supremacy,58 implied powers59 
and fundamental rights.60 In Weiler’s opinion: 61 
 
The measure of creative interpretation of the Treaty was so great as to be 
consonant with a self-image of a constitutional court in a ‘constitutional’ polity. 
 
In the present author’s opinion, this is a strong example of how the 
European Court of Justice derives constitutional principles directly from the 
acquis communautaire, which encompasses ECJ case-law and general 
principles as well as the treaties, rather than from any specific textual source. 
This seems to bear more similarity with the British common-law approach to 
constitutionalism than it does to the rigid textual approach of many 
continental European legal systems. 
These judicially created, constitutional doctrines only have full effect, 
however, as a result of the Community’s strong system of judicial review.62 
                                                           
53 Henceforth referred to simply as Parliament. This is short hand for the procedure 
whereby an act is approved not only by the House of Commons but also by the House of 
Lords and then receives Royal assent. 
54 Henceforth referred to simply as IGC. The procedure whereby treaties must be ratified by 
national parliaments after being signed at an IGC can be seen as somewhat analogous to the 
procedure in the British Parliament ibid. 
55 Henceforth referred to as the ECJ. 
56 JHH Weiler ‘The Transformation of Europe’ in JHH Weiler (ed) The Constitution of Europe 
(CUP, Cambridge 1999). 
57 Established in the landmark case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; As Weiler puts it: 
‘Community legal norms that are clear, precise and self-sufficient...must be regarded as the 
law of the land in the sphere of application of community law’, JHH Weiler ibid. at p. 19.  
58 Established in Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; According to Weiler ‘The 
combination of these two doctrines, [supremacy and direct effect], means that Community 
norms that produce direct effects are not merely the law of the land but the ‘higher law’ of 
the land’. JHH Weiler (n 56)  at p. 22. 
59 It was recognised in Case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Communities [1971] ECR 263 (ERTA) that the existence of an internal competence 
implies an external, treaty-making power on the part of the Community. 
60 This doctrine was fully elaborated on in Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v 
Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
61 Weiler (n. 56) at p. 24. 
62 Weiler (n 56) at p. 25: ‘The constitutionalisation claim regarding the Treaties establishing 
the European Community can only be sustained by adding one more layer of analysis: the 
system of judicial remedies and enforcement’. 
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As mentioned previously,63 judicial review is a key means of upholding 
constitutional principles. Similar to the above discussion about 
parliamentary supremacy, the lack of judicial review of the founding 
Treaties of the EU could be seen as undermining its constitutional nature. A 
solution to this problem can be found by looking to British constitutional 
theory. It is here that the in-depth discussion above, about the possibility of 
judicial review of primary legislation in the UK, is particularly relevant. 
A central feature of the EC treaty is its strong system of judicial 
review of secondary legislation.64 This seems very similar to the common-
law power of the British courts to review ultra vires secondary legislation, 
which, as argued above, can be extended to justify the review of primary 
legislation. In the present writer’s submission, the ECJ’s power of judicial 
review of secondary legislation could be extended to allow judicial review of 
the treaties. This is, however, a controversial view and is not a power that 
the ECJ has claimed. Indeed, it would not be politically feasible for the ECJ 
to do so, given the opposition this would meet with from EU member states. 
Despite this, there is an argument to be made, based in constitutional theory, 
for the possible existence of such a power.  
It is important to note that the Treaties of the EU neither expressly allow 
nor prohibit judicial review of primary legislation. Therefore, it would be 
very difficult to infer such a power based on textual references. However, as 
argued above, the treaties are not the definitive source of constitutional 
powers and principles but rather the embodiment of some of them. In this 
way, limitations exist on the supremacy of the will of the treaty makers, 
similar to those that exist on parliamentary sovereignty in Britain. One such 
limitation is the rule of law, on which the EU is said to be founded,65 and 
central to which is some sort of power of judicial review of primary 
legislation.66 An example of this in the British context is the ability of 
individuals whose rights are infringed (victims) to challenge primary 
legislative acts of the Scottish Parliament before the Court of Session and for 
that court to strike down those acts for violating the Human Rights Act 
1998.67 Whilst this is not the case with primary legislation of the Westminster 
parliament,68 such a power is theoretically possible, as argued above. The 
                                                           
63 A Stone (n 42). 
64 Article 230 EC provides that: ‘The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted 
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the 
Commission...and acts of the Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third 
parties’.  
65 Article 6 TEU; Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1984] ECR 
3325. 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 21 March 2002 in Case C-50/00 P UPA 
[2002] ECR I-6677: The Advocate General notes that Member States do not generally exclude 
individuals from challenging primary legislation which violates constitutionally enshrined 
rights or fundamental principles of law. 
67 Scotland Act 1998 s.29. 
68 The House of Lords only has the express statutory power to declare primary legislation of 
the Westminster Parliament incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 but not to 
invalidate it. 
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theoretical power of the ECJ to invalidate treaty provisions based on general 
principles of EU law gives weight to the submission that the EU is a 
constitutional polity with various constitutional documents, which give only 
partial expression to an underlying, unwritten constitutionalism rather than 
one possessing a formal written constitution. 
 
6. The Lisbon Treaty: Another Constitutional Document 
On an examination of the text of both documents, it seems that the substance 
of the Lisbon Treaty69 is largely similar to that of, the now defunct, Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE),70 in terms of the reforms it 
institutes.71 However, much of the symbolism of the TECE has not been 
reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty.72 More significant perhaps, is the fact that 
the term ‘Constitution’ appears nowhere in the text of the Lisbon Treaty. 
This seems indicative of the intention of the drafters of the treaty that it 
should not be perceived as a constitution after the failure of the TECE.73    
The Lisbon Treaty possesses several distinct features which are highly 
indicative of the fact that it is not a formal constitution as such. In addition 
to its lack of symbolism, the Lisbon treaty was not designed to stand alone 
but rather, merely, to amend the existing treaties. The net effect of these 
amendments may be very similar to that achieved by the TECE in 
substantive terms but the Lisbon Treaty does not create a single new 
constitutional document as the TECE would have done. 
Furthermore, not only does the form of the Lisbon Treaty suggest that 
it is not a Constitution but also the manner in which it was adopted. In the 
vast majority74 of member states, this treaty was adopted by the normal 
means of ratifying any other international treaty, namely parliamentary 
ratification. It is particularly noteworthy that those member states, whose 
referenda halted the ratification of the TECE,75 also opted for parliamentary 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This suggests that the Lisbon Treaty is no 
different from any other international treaty and certainly not a formal 
constitution. 
A useful illustration of this point is a brief comparison between the 
respective constitutional amendment procedures in the United States of 
                                                           
69 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community [2007] OJ C306/1. 
70 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C316/1. 
71 N Moussis, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: A Constitution Without the Name’, (2008) 3 Revue du 
Marche Commun et de l'Union Europeenne Issue 516 at pp. 161-168.  
72 For example, there is no longer any reference to the symbols of unification such as the 
flag, the anthem and the day of Europe.  
73 G DeBúrca, ‘Reflections on the EU's Path from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon 
Treaty’ Available at SSRN: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1148448_code339387.pdf?abstractid
=1124586&mirid=3> (accessed 13 July 2010). 
74 Ireland is constitutionally mandated to hold a referendum 
75 Namely France and the Netherlands. 
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America and in the United Kingdom. The U.S. Constitution is a formal 
written text and can only be amended through a special procedure distinct 
from the ordinary legislative procedure.76 An analogous procedure in the 
context of the EU might be the adoption of a text resulting from a convention 
and its subsequent domestic ratification by referenda held in the various 
member states.  
This contrasts starkly with the situation in the UK, where 
constitutional amendment has been effected through the passing, in the 
usual manner,77 of ordinary legislative acts, which have nevertheless taken 
on a special constitutional and political significance.78 The distinction 
between these two ways of amending a constitution is explained by Dicey:79 
 
When a country is governed under a constitution which is intended either to be 
unchangeable or at any rate to be changeable only with special difficulty, the 
constitution, which is nothing else than the laws which are intended to have a 
character of permanence or immutability, is necessarily expressed in writing.... 
Where, on the other hand, every law can be legally changed with equal ease or 
with equal difficulty, there arises no absolute need for reducing the constitution to 
a written form, or even for looking upon a definite set of laws as specially making 
up the constitution. 
 
Here Dicey is commenting specifically on the British Constitution. However, 
in the present writer’s view, this can be extended to cover the EU too. Dicey 
seems to suggest an inversely proportional relationship between the 
flexibility of the amendment procedure of a constitution and the likelihood 
of the existence of a formal written constitution. This lends credibility to the 
assertion that the use of the ordinary adoption procedure for international 
treaties in the EU, when combined with other indicators outlined above, is 
indicative that the Lisbon Treaty is not a formal written constitution. 
This, however, does not preclude the Lisbon Treaty from being a 
constitutionally and politically significant document. The reforms that the 
Lisbon Treaty introduces are wide ranging and will have a significant 
impact on the workings of the European Union. One of the most significant 
areas of reform is the powers of the institutions of the EU. Both the 
European Parliament and the ECJ have been given significantly more power. 
As regards the former, the ordinary legislative procedure80 has been 
extended to cover more areas, giving the European Parliament a greater role 
to play in the adoption of legislation. This seems to come at the expense of 
                                                           
76 Article V of the U.S. Constitution states that: ‘The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both 
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of 
ratification may be proposed by the Congress...’. 
77 See (n 53). 
78 See (n 46 – 49) for examples. 
79 Dicey (n 24) at p. 90. 
80 Formerly known as the co decision procedure. 
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the member states acting in the Council because the extension of qualified 
majority voting to more areas allows the express wishes of the member 
states to be overridden to a greater extent. However, national parliaments 
have been given a more active role to play in the EU, for example through 
the use of the yellow and orange card procedure.81 The ECJ also gains 
greater influence through the extension of its jurisdiction into the area of 
justice and home affairs due to the merger of the third pillar with the first. 
In addition to reforming the institutional balance within the EU, the 
Lisbon Treaty also enhances the protection of human rights. Firstly, the 
Lisbon Treaty makes the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU legally 
binding.82 Whilst this may not have the effect of creating any new rights it 
codifies and raises the profile of existing rights.83 Furthermore, accession to 
the ECHR,84 provided for in the Lisbon Treaty,85 would ensure consistency 
between these two human rights regimes in Europe by subjecting the EU 
institutions to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.86 
Altering the institutional balance and increasing the protection of human 
rights within the EU are merely prominent examples of the constitutional 
and political significance of the Lisbon Treaty. Other significant aspects 
include the express enunciation of the principle of conferred powers,87 the 
granting of legal personality to the EU88 and the restatement of the 
democratic principles that form the foundation of the EU.89  
   Despite these far-reaching reforms of a constitutional nature, the 
Lisbon Treaty need not be considered a constitution as such but can still 
remain a constitutionally significant document, as recent reforms in the UK 
illustrate. Examples of such documents in the British context are the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Human Rights Act 1998. Both these 
acts were passed under the normal legislative procedure in the UK; however 
both bear a high degree of constitutional significance. The former, 
introduces institutional reforms that have a fundamental impact on the 
separation of powers in the UK, as the Lisbon treaty does for the EU. The 
latter, whilst it may not introduce rights that were unavailable under the 
common-law, codifies them and makes ECHR rights justiciable before the 
UK courts, in a similar way that the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
accession to the ECHR does for the EU. Therefore, by extension of British 
                                                           
81 These give national parliaments the right to express concerns on subsidiarity directly to 
the institution which initiated the proposed legislation. 
82 Article 6 TEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) 
83 K Lenaerts & E De Smijter, ‘A ‘Bill of Rights’ for the European Union’ 2001 Common 
Market Law Review at pp. 273-300. 
84 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950. 
85 Article 6 TEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). 
86 S Douglas-Scott, ‘A tale of two courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing 
European human rights acquis’ [2006] CMLR 43 629-665. 
87 Article 3(6) and 4(1) TEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). 
88 Article 47 TEU (As inserted by the Lisbon Treaty). 
89 Article 2 TEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). 
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common-law principles, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as constitutionally 
significant whilst not being a constitution per se. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The institutions of the EU pass binding laws which have too fundamental an 
impact on the lives of individuals for this supranational entity not to have a 
constitution. The perceived lack of the ethno-cultural markers of a state 
constitution, such as a common language, heritage and culture, prove no bar 
to the existence of a transnational constitution for the EU. Such a 
constitution is novel and unique and not dependent on the precepts of state 
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, age-old constitutions, such as the British 
common-law constitution, can be helpful in determining how this new 
constitutional system ought to be perceived and interpreted. Due to its 
largely unwritten and uncodified form, the constitutional arrangements of 
the UK are sufficiently flexible to be capable of being adapted to serve as a 
model for the EU’s constitution. On this reading, the EU neither needs nor 
has a written constitution. Instead, the EU has a composite constitution 
derived directly from the acquis communautaire of which the treaties merely 
form part. Therefore, despite its highly significant institutional and 
constitutional reforms, the Lisbon Treaty ranks as just another constitutional 
document, not a formal constitution.  
 
